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ABSTRACT
From the outsourcer’s perspective, the outsourcing literature emphasizes the importance of contracts and risk awareness for
managing outsourcing ventures. However, there is a lack of theoretical foundation with regard to the importance of risk and
contract design towards outsourcing success. By extending the risk model of Bahli and Rivard (2001) we aim at answering
the following questions: (1) ‘how does the design of the outsourcing contract impact on outsourcing risk?’ and (2) ‘how, in
turn, does outsourcing risk affect outsourcing success?’. Based on multiple case studies of Business Process Outsourcing
(BPO) arrangements, our results show that the ‘complementarity’ of contract clauses — Service Level Agreements, Penalty-
Reward-Systems, and Pricing — is important to contractually implement risk mitigation. Furthermore, by synchronizing the
objectives of the in- and outsourcer ex ante resulting in specific contract clauses which compensate for losses ex post, the
existence of risk and its impact on outsourcing success can be limited.
Keywords
Business Process Outsourcing, Risk Mitigation, Outsourcing Contract
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The examination of outsourcing — the purchase of a good or service that was previously provided internally (Lacity and
Hirschheim, 1993) — has been a domain of IS research for several years now. When considering the potential gains that can
be  achieved  through  outsourcing,  most  of  the  academic  discussions  have  addressed  the  questions  of  “why”,  “what”  and
“how” to outsource (Dibbern, Goles, Hirschheim and Jayatilaka, 2004). This research focuses on “how to outsource”,
especially on an important prerequisite of a successful outsourcing deal: the design of the outsourcing contract. The
complexity of outsourcing arrangements and the severity of potential damage is acknowledged within the outsourcing
community (see e.g. Earl, 1996; Willcocks and Currie, 1997). Therefore, there is an increased concern with the management
of an outsourcing venture, and in particular with the issue of risk mitigation. The outsourcing contract is regarded as the most
prevailing instrument for mitigating outsourcing risks (Willcocks and Kern, 1998). A thorough understanding of the risk
profile, risk causes and risk consequences seems to be an important prerequisite to set up an effective contract ensuring
outsourcing success (Aubert, Dussault, Patry and Rivard, 1999). Based on the outsourcer’s perspective, we therefore aim at
answering the following research questions:
· How does the design of the outsourcing contract impact on outsourcing risk?
· How, in turn, does outsourcing risk affect outsourcing success?
To approach these research questions, we will first review the current literature on the role of contracts in outsourcing
relationship management and the interplay between risk and contract design. Using these insights we will develop a causal
model to illuminate causal relations between risk, contract design and outsourcing success as motivated in our research
questions. Since the objective of our study is analytical generalization, we have followed Yin (2003) and used case studies
for empirical validation. Our research objects are Business Process Outsourcing arrangements in the German banking area
which are intensively analyzed within our case study analysis section. At last, we summarize the contributions and limitations
of our research.
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
In most relationships the parties involved do not have perfectly congruent goals, and therefore a contract is developed to
detail their relationship (Banker and Kemerer, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989a). The study of contractual mechanisms in IS
outsourcing is still at an early stage (Aubert, Houde, Patry and Rivard, 2003). However, some research has been done in this
field during the past two years (for example, see Proceedings of AMCIS 2004 and 2005). IS outsourcing studies dealing with
contractual issues often incorporate a broader view by dealing with all aspects of relationship management. Our research
specifically deals with two important aspects of relationship management: (1) the moderating effect of contracts on
outsourcing risk, (2) and the subsequent effect on outsourcing success.
The general importance of a contract within an outsourcing arrangement has been stressed by several researchers (e.g. Kern
1997 and Kern and Willcocks 2001). However, so far research on IS outsourcing contracts has focused on the importance of
single contract clauses in general (for example, Beulen and Ribbers, 2002 and Goo, Kishore and Rao, 2004 focus primarily
on Service Level Agreements) but has not considered their interplay with each other to effectively mitigate risks. Our
research aims at closing this gap by means of an in-depth analysis of selected contract clauses and their impact on each other
to mitigate outsourcing risks.
The contract can be regarded as the pivotal point: it regulates the venture (Kern, 1997). If contract and negotiation processes
are thoroughly defined, a company has the necessary protection for dealing with daily actions and results, for settling disputes
or for terminating the relationship (Marcolin and McLellan, 1998). In particular, the contract is regarded as the most
important instrument to mitigate outsourcing risk (Aubert and Patry, 2005). Outsourcing risks attract researchers (Dibbern et
al., 2004) and practitioners (Gartner, 2004) alike. The primary objective of this interest is to analyze how risk might influence
outsourcing success (Dibbern et al., 2004). However, this relationship has been addressed by very few articles. Instead, most
contributions aim at exploring risk compositions (Bahli and Rivard, 2003b; Gewald and Hinz, 2004) and risk causes (e.g.
Bahli and Rivard, 2003a). Aubert et al. (2005) relate outsourcing risk to outsourcing success by illuminating the importance
of risk analysis and risk management for the prediction of outsourcing outcomes. Thus, there is a close relation between
outsourcing risk and outsourcing success, which should be analyzed in more detail with regard to actual losses as suggested
by Aubert et al. (2005).
There are different approaches to define outsourcing risks (see review in, e.g., Aubert, Patry and Rivard, 2002). We use a
qualitative risk definition developed by Barki, Rivard and Talbot (1993) as well as Aubert, Patry and Rivard (1998): risk is a
combination of risk factors and undesirable outcomes. The risk factors represent the probability of undesirable outcomes.
Every risk factor causes a certain undesirable outcome. Thus, the extent of undesirable outcomes depends on the severity of
the risk factors.
As shown by Bahli and Rivard (2003b) among others, these risk factors include:
· Moral hazard (the service provider acts to the detriment of the outsourcer)
· Imperfect commitment (the service provider delivers less than he promised)
· Uncertainty emerging from business (e.g. unsteady transaction volumes or regulatory requirements) and/or technological
changes (e.g. security fixes)
· Process specificity
· Measurement problems
Other factors mentioned by Bahli and Rivard (2003b) include adverse selection, interdependence of sub-processes, small
number of service providers and experience-related factors. As we aim at analyzing risks which can be mitigated by the
contract, these factors have not been considered. Adverse selection takes place before the contract is negotiated.
Interdependence depends on the percentage of outsourced sub-processes and is not controllable using contract clauses. The
number of service providers and the experience level of internal and external staff cannot notably be affected by contract
design.
As outlined by Bahli and Rivard (2003a), these risk factors entail possible negative outcomes in the dimensions of cost
escalations or service debasements. They can appear in the following scenarios:
· Lock-in (being unable to switch service providers or to backsource)
· Costly contractual amendments
· Increased costs of services
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· Service debasement
· Unexpected transition and management costs
· Disputes and litigation
These risk factors and undesirable outcomes have not been analyzed in the context of BPO. BPO is a relatively new
phenomenon, but it is suggested that it will be one of the largest areas of growth in the outsourcing market (Gartner, 2004).
For the scope of this paper, BPO is defined as the delegation of one or more entire business processes to third party providers,
including the software and hardware that support those processes (Halvey and Melby, 2000). A business process is defined as
a “set of logically related tasks performed to achieve a defined business outcome” (Davenport and Short, 1990, p. 12). Thus,
BPO is the combination of application development/maintenance outsourcing, IT infrastructure outsourcing and the
outsourcing of business activities which are not IT supported such as business process re-design.
RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
In this section we are developing our research model. First, the underlying causal model is introduced which takes up the
aspects presented in the previous section. A description of how the constructs are operationalized is provided. A further
overview of the constructs’ operationalization and respective references to IS literature can be found in Table 3. Second, the
way in which the model’s underlying hypotheses have been derived is described. All hypotheses are summarized in Table 1.
Research Model
Figure 1 presents our research model as used within our case studies (arrows reflect hypotheses and ‘circles’ represent
constructs).
Figure 1. Research Model
Description of Research Model
We extend the model of Bahli and Rivard (2001; 2003a) by adding aspects of contract quality, outsourcing success, and
extent of negative consequences: First, we analyze additional contractual risk mitigation instruments – such as Service Level
Agreements (SLAs) or Penalty-Reward-Systems. Thereby, we aim at explicitly determining concrete risk mitigation contents
of the outsourcing contract as recommended by Aubert et al. (2003). Second, we include outsourcing success as an
endogenous variable to illuminate the importance of risk severity (and risk mitigation) in relation to the outsourcing
arrangement. Finally, to relate the risk (i.e. risk factors and undesirable outcomes) to the outsourcing success, we insert the
extent of negative consequences as proposed by Aubert and Patry (2005). Negative consequences illustrate the occurrence
and intensity of undesirable outcomes. Thus, negative consequences can also be viewed as loss instances.
Operationalization of Constructs
During discussions with experts it turned out that SLAs, Pricing, Penalty-Reward-Systems, Liability Clauses, Benchmarking
Clauses, Renegotiation Options and Price Caps are the contract clauses most suitable for risk mitigation purposes. Therefore,
the existence and design of those clauses has been chosen to describe the construct contract quality. To analyze SLAs, we
ask for the linkage of SLAs to a Penalty-Reward-System as suggested by Beulen and Ribbers (2002) and the set-up of
controlling instruments to monitor the degree of SLA fulfilment (Harris, Giunipero and Hult, 1998). When examining Pricing
Clauses, we aim at finding out whether variable or fixed pricing has been agreed upon (McFarlan and Nolan, 1995).
Furthermore, the existence of Price Adjustment Clauses is determined (Harris et al., 1998). Liability Clauses are examined
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with  regard  to  their  existence  (Lacity  and  Willcocks,  2003)  and  whether  or  not  they  are  related  to  deal  size.  To  analyze
Renegotiation Options, we ask for the existence of change request procedures and agreement on (early) termination (Harris et
al., 1998). A contract consists of many other clauses which may to some extent also be suitable for risk mitigation purposes.
For an overview of further contract clauses see Lacity and Hirschheim (1993) as well as Kern and Willcocks (2000). We are
aware that a contract represents the results of bilateral negotiations. Our goal is to analyze the effect of (existing) outsourcing
clauses concerning their ability to mitigate risks on outsourcing success. We take the existence of a certain contract clause as
an indicator that this contract clause has been considered/negotiated to mitigate a certain risk.
To measure the severity of risk factors and the extent of undesirable outcomes,  we use the risk factors and undesirable
outcomes as described in section “Theoretical Foundations”. For negative consequences,  we ask for real losses instead of
potential losses in the dimensions of cost escalation and service debasement. Furthermore, we measure outsourcing success
as the achievement of outsourcing objectives (Kern, 1997) and the realization of economic or technological benefits (Grover,
Cheon and Teng, 1996). We are aware that also other factors and aspects contribute to outsourcing success (for example
‘partnership quality’, see Lee and Kim, 1999). However, as our goal is to analyze the impact of outsourcing contract design
on outsourcing risk, these aspects have been somewhat disregarded within this research.
Derivation of Hypotheses
We propose that the quality of the contract moderates the relationship between a risk factor and an undesirable outcome. For
example, the goal of a BPO project is to improve quality. Within a risk analysis, the risk factor ‘moral hazard’ has been
identified as a potential threat. The severity of this risk factor can be partially mitigated by a contract including SLAs
combined with a penalty system. Thereby, the extent of the undesirable outcome (i.e. service debasement such as a delay in
the execution of a securities’ transaction) can be limited. This implies that the extent of this risk and the respective negative
consequences  are  smaller  than  without  the  combination  of  SLAs  and  a  penalty  system.  Thus,  the  goal  of  quality
improvements is less affected.
The causes and effects of our research model are reflected in our hypotheses as shown in the following table.
No. Hypothesis
H1 The severity of risk factors are positively associated with the extent of undesirable outcomes (Bahli et al. 2003a).
H2 The impact of risk factors on undesirable outcomes is moderated by the contract quality (Bahli et al. 2001).
H3 Undesirable outcomes positively impact the extent of negative consequences (loss) (Bahli et al. 2001).
H4 Negative consequences negatively contribute to the achievement of outsourcing objectives
(Earl 1996; Willcocks et al. 1997).
Table 1. Hypotheses
The hypotheses are based upon literature reviews and expert interviews. Since all references deal with IT outsourcing
arrangements, we aim at analyzing contract related hypotheses in BPO settings. In addition, we concentrate on contract
related cause-effect-relationships, which leads to a different construct measurement as outlined in Table 3.
CASE STUDIES
Case Study Environment
Our research analyzes BPO within the German banking industry. Due to its IT-intensive business processes, the potential for
BPO appears to be particularly high in the banking industry. The consideration of the German banking industry has been
twofold: first, the financial services sector is the second largest buyer of outsourcing services (Gartner, 2004); second, the
German regulations on outsourcing are particularly strict and detailed (§25a of the German Banking Act) making
contractually tied control rights especially desirable.
Methodology
Since the interplay of outsourcing risk, contract, loss, and success has not been researched in a BPO context before, analytical
generalization based on case study research is projected. To achieve the necessary rigor, it is important during design and
preparation to explicitly define the research question, propositions, and the unit of analysis. The research questions employed
for our case studies have been introduced in the introduction section and contain ’How’ questions which are considered
appropriate for case studies (Yin, 2003). The propositions used in our cases are theoretically grounded (see section 2). As a
unit of analysis we chose risk mitigation approaches within BPO arrangements and focus on outsourcing contracts as the
most important risk management tool (Aubert and Patry, 2005).
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Our interview partners are project managers, managers of the retained organization and banks' risk managers. From the
project managers we want to learn more about the original outsourcing goals. In addition, project managers usually initiated
the risk analysis for contract negotiations and therefore know the intention behind each contract clause. Risk managers and
managers of the retained organization should provide us with details on how the contract is actually ‘working’ and whether
the implemented risk mitigation strategies are suitable.
As suggested by Eisenhardt (1989b) and Yin (2003) our questions for construct operationalization are mainly derived from
literature. We use both, previously applied and thereby validated questions, and general conclusions that are derived from
common outsourcing literature. The pre-structured interviews lasted about three to four hours and were conducted by two
researchers. The interview partners provided us with additional documentation (including outsourcing contracts) afterwards.
The answers given together with the respective additional documents were elaborated, analyzed and refined based on
Eisenhardt (1989b) and Yin (2003). The interviewees reviewed and validated the collected case study data and reports as
recommended by Eisenhardt (1989b) and Yin (2003).
Case Study Description
Our cases reflect the outsourcing arrangement of securities settlement processes. These processes have been chosen due to
their high degree of automation and IT dependency. The next table provides a brief overview of the general settings of each
BPO deal analyzed.
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3
Outsourced Service Settlement of Securities Settlement of Securities Settlement of Securities
Number of Transactions (per year) > 500,000 < 100,000 < 100,000
Deal Volume (in bn Euros) 5-10 1-5 10-20
Percentage of Outsourced Sub-Processes
Compared to the Overall Process
70% 50% 70%
Outsourcing Objectives 1. Cost Savings
2. Quality Improvements
1. Cost Savings
2. Quality Improvements
1. Cost Savings
2. Quality Improvements
Table 2. Overview – Case Studies
Results
The following Table 3 provides an overview of our constructs, their operationalization, and the respective empirical results.
We will analyze these findings in further detail in the next section “Case Study Analysis”.
Construct Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3
Severity of Risk
Factors
(Bahli and Rivard,
2003b)
1.: No moral hazard present
2.: Imperfect commitment not present
3.: No significant uncertainty
4.: No process specificity
5.: No measurement problems
1.: Moral hazard not present
2.: Imperfect commitment not present
3.: High uncertainty due to frequent business and
     regulatory changes
4.: No process specificity
5.: Intensive measurement problems
     measurements criteria are defined but
     measurements almost impossible to conduct
1.: Moral hazard present
2.: No imperfect commitment
3.: High uncertainty because of new  products
     and new regulatory requirements
4.: High process specificity due to individual
    customer requirements
5.: Intensive measurement problems: no
    measurement criteria defined
Contract Quality
with regard to risk
mitigation
(Kern, 1997;
Saunders, Gebelt and
Hu 1997; Kern and
Willcocks, 2001)
1.: Yes
2.: High
3.: SLAs are controlled twice a year. This is
     done in cooperation with the
     service provider
1.: Yes
2.: Bank 2 is averagly satisfied with
     SLA-Framework
3.: So far, SLAs are not monitored.
     This is going to change within the next
     months
1.: Yes
2.: Bank 3 is averagly satisfied with
     SLA-Framework
3.: No, as due to the capital involvement of the
     corporation with the service provider
     (subsidiary)  the reporting of a negative
     status would have had no consequences
1. & 2.: Bank 1 has set-up a penalty-reward
            system for the most important SLAs
1.: No penalties defined
2.: SLAs are not related to pricing
1.: No penalties defined
2.: SLAs are not related to pricing
1.: Yes
2.: Yes, differentiation between different
     causes
3.: Yes, liability limit is a percentage-ratio
1.: Yes
2.: Yes, differentiation between different
     causes
3.: Yes, liability limit is a percentage-ratio
1.: Yes
2.: Yes, differentiation between different
     causes
3.: Yes, liability limit is a percentage-ratio
1.: Service is based on unit costs
2.: The contract comprehends price adjustment
     clauses as a consequence of benchmarking
1.: Service is based on unit costs
2.: No price adjustment clauses exist
1.: Service was based on a headcount  basis
2.: No price adjustment clauses exist
1.: Yes, benchmarking clause exists. Bank 1
     undertakes a benchmarking once a year
1. No benchmarking clause existst 1. No benchmarking clause existst
Operationalization
1. The service provider acts on the detriment of the bank,
     i.e. pricing new services exceptionally high
     (=> Moral hazard) (Aubert et al., 1998)
2. The service provider delivers less than promised
    (=> Imperfect commitment) (Aubert et al., 1998)
3. Uncertainty emerging from business and/or
    technological changes (Earl, 1996)
4. Process specificity (Bahli and Rivard, 2003b)
5. Measurement problems (Bahli and Rivard, 2003b)
SLA Clauses (Lacity and Willcocks 2003)
1. Existence of detailed SLAs for all services
    comprehending the outsourcing deal
    (Domberger, Fernandez and Fiebig, 2000)
2. Satisfaction with SLA-Framework
    (Lacity and Willcocks, 2003)
3. Controlling/Monitoring of SLAs
    (Lacity and Willcocks, 2003)
Pricing Clauses (Lacity and Willcocks, 2003)
1. Application of fix or variable pricing
    (McFarlan and Nolan, 1995)
2. Existence of price adjustment clauses
    (Harris et al., 1998)
Liability Clauses (Lacity and Willcocks, 2003)
1. Existence of liability clauses
   (Lacity and Willcocks, 2003)
2. Differentiation between willful misconduct,
    gross and ordinary negligence
3. Relatedness of limits/amounts to the deal size
Penalty-Reward-System (Beulen and Ribbers, 2002)
1. Definition of penalties for not meeting the service
    (Beulen and Ribbers, 2002)
2. Relatedness of SLAs to pricing
   (Harris, Giunipero and Hult, 1998)
Benchmarking (Cross, 1995)
1. Benchmarking comprehends right to compare the
   actual prices of the service provider with other vendors
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Construct Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3
Contract Quality
(cont'd)
with regard to risk
mitigation
(Kern, 1997;
Saunders, Gebelt and
Hu 1997; Kern and
1.: Yes, renegotiations can be based on
     the results of benchmarking
2.: Yes
3.: Yes
1.:  No
2.: Yes
3.: No, not necessary as contract can always be
     terminated with a one-year period of notice.
1.: No
2.: Yes
3.: No early termination possible
1. Yes, price cap exists 1. No price cap exists 1. No price cap exists
Extend of
Undesirable
Outcomes
(Bahli and Rivard,
2003a)
1.: No increased cost
2.: No unexpected transition and management
     cost
3.: No costly contractual amendments
4.: No service debasement
5.: Yes, the transition would cost more
     than 3.000 FTE's
6.: No significant disputes and litigations
1.: Intensively increased cost escalation
2.: No unexpected transition and  management
     costs
3.: No costly contractual amendments
4.: Extensive service debasement
5.: It is almost impossible to switch service
     providers
6.: Frequent disputes, no litigations
1.: Extensive costs of services - internal
     workforce have to perform work-arounds
     due to massive errors by the service provider
2.: Extensive management costs due to the
     workarounds
3.: No costly contractual amendments
4.: Extensive service debasement due to
     process errors caused by the service provider
5.: Moderate significance of "lock-in"
6.: Very frequent disputes, no litigation
Extend of Loss
(Bahli and Rivard,
2003a)
1.: No cost escalation
2.: No service debasement
1.: Expected cost savings have farly not been
     reached
2.: Moderate losses from  service debasement
1.: Cost for service provision and internal
     workforce higher than costs for
     internal delivery
2.: Severe service debasements
Success
(Kern, 1997)
1.: Expectations achieved
2.: Technolgical and economic benefits
     realized
1.: Expectations partially achieved
2.: Technolgical and economic benefits
     partially realized
1.: Expectations not achieved,
     process backsourced
2.: Technolgical and economic
     benefits not realized; process backsourced
Operationalization
Price Caps
1. Existence of minimum or maximum fee
   (Elitzur and Wensley, 1997): based on
   such a fee prices can be renegotiated
   due to volume fluctuations
1. Cost escalation
2. Service debasement
1. Achievement of expectations within the outsourcing
   decision  (Kern, 1997; Lee and Kim, 1999)
2. Realization of economic and technological benefits
    (Grover, Cheon and Teng, 1996)
1. Increased costs of services
2. Unexpected transition and management costs
3. Costly contractual amendments
4. Service debasement
5. Lock-in
6. Disputes and litigation
Renegotiation Clauses (Lacity and Willcocks, 2003)
1. Existence of renegotiation options
    (Elitzur and Wensley, 1997)
2. Existence of contract flexibility in the type, the level
   and the quantity of service (Beulen and Ribbers, 2002)
3. Possibility of early termination  (Harris et al., 1998)
Table 3. Constructs, Operationalization and Case Study Results
Case Study Analysis
In order to analyze our hypotheses, we take a look at the extent of different outsourcing risks. We identify the moral hazard
as a driver of service debasement. Furthermore, we will show that service debasement causes cost escalation. Literature on IS
Outsourcing Risk has not recognized these linkages yet (Aubert et al., 2003; Aubert et al., 1998). In addition, our research
provides evidence that when designing contracts, the ‘complementarity’ of single clauses should be considered to implement
risk mitigation strategies. So far, research on IS outsourcing contracts has focused on the importance of the contract in
general or on single contract clauses only (e.g. Alborz, Seddon and Scheepers, 2004; Beulen and Ribbers, 2002; Domberger
et al., 2000; Goo et al., 2004).
From a risk perspective, it becomes evident that moral hazard drives service debasement. The combination of Service Level
Agreements with a Penalty-Reward-System can minimize the risk of such debasements: Bank 1 has negotiated a detailed
SLA  framework  that  is  in  line  with  the  measures  suggested  by  Domberger  et  al.  (2000).  This  framework  is  linked  to  a
Penalty-Reward-System  meaning  that  the  non-fulfillment  of  a  service  leads  to  the  payment  of  a  reduced  fee  by  the
outsourcer. An over-fulfillment of services results in the payment of a bonus. SLAs are controlled and discussed with the
service provider on a regular basis. Within the SLA framework, all outsourced processes and the way in which their
accomplishment is measured have been agreed upon. Bank 1 states that based on their service level framework, they are able
to maintain control over outsourced services. A decrease in service quality has not occurred so far. Bank 1’s SLAs are well-
defined. The service provider exactly knows what Bank 1 expects from them. The objectives of the outsourcing deal (i.e. cost
savings and quality improvements) have been reached so far. In contrast, the outsourcing contracts of Bank 2 and Bank 3
only contain an SLA framework. The link to a Penalty-Reward-System is missing. Both banks do not control their SLAs on a
regular basis. Bank 2 complains about a ’creeping’ decline in service quality. Bank 3 had to suffer from service debasement,
as services were not clearly defined within the SLA framework. Bank 3 was fighting with quality problems caused by the
supplier’s strategy to standardize the clients' processes for its own cost reduction purposes. As a consequence, these quality
problems forced Bank 3 to allocate internal staff for the accomplishment of “workarounds”. These “workarounds” demanded
so many resources that cost reductions from external service delivery were exceeded. As no Penalty-Reward-System was set
up, Bank 3 was not able to introduce any incentives for the service provider to avoid service debasements. The cost reduction
had a negative influence on the outsourcing success. Finally, Bank 3 backsourced its services.
Process specificity can drive the risk of cost escalation. Bank 3 aimed at serving their customers individually, which resulted
in a high extent of additional (sub-) processes. Since the service provider was not willing to deliver these processes, the bank
had to set up internal staff. The allocation of this staff resulted in severe costs, which has been one important reason why the
bank backsourced the entire process. Another reason for backsourcing was the fact that the objectives of the bank and the
outsourcer did not match. The expected sharing of risk and reward did not occur. This case shows that a clear definition of
SLAs is of utmost importance to synchronize expectations of the in- and outsourcer ex-ante.
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As a result, potential service debasement caused by moral hazard and potential cost escalation caused by process specificity
can be limited by combining SLAs with a Penalty-Reward-System. An SLA framework on its own does not provide enough
incentives for the service provider to deliver high quality services.
The risk of service debasement can also be influenced by the incompetence of the service provider resulting in ‘wrong’
actions taken either by mistake or on purpose. Well-defined liability clauses can prevent losses caused by willful misconduct,
gross or ordinary negligence of the service provider. All banks have contractually agreed upon such clauses. The limit of
liability in each case is related to deal size (i.e. defined in percentages). All banks state that liability clauses are very
important to actually prevent financial losses. However, it is difficult to compensate for qualitative (e.g. reputational) losses
that may also be caused by gross or ordinary negligence of the service provider.
Uncertainty can drive the risk of cost escalation, especially when the bank has to pay excessive prices. Benchmarking clauses
combined with renegotiation options can minimize this risk. Bank 1’s outsourcing contract contains a clause that allows them
once a year to benchmark the service provider’s prices with market prices. If prices are above a certain threshold, Bank 1 has
the  right  to  renegotiate  fees.  This  mechanism  prevents  Bank  1  from  paying  excessive  fees.  Bank  2  and  Bank  3  did  not
contractually agree on a benchmarking clause. Within Bank 2, the service provider increases fees continuously and prices
new services exceptionally high. As neither a benchmarking nor a renegotiation option has been contractually implemented,
Bank  2  feels  that  they  pay  too  much  for  the  services  received.  The  achievement  of  cost  savings  has  been  an  important
outsourcing decision criterion for Bank 2. This risk and the respective negative consequence therefore negatively influence
outsourcing success. As a result, we conclude that the risk of cost escalation caused by uncertainty can be mitigated by
combining a benchmarking clause with a renegotiation option.
Uncertainty may also drive the risk of volume fluctuations. The agreement of price caps linked with a renegotiation option
can minimize this risk. The contract of Bank 1 contains such a price cap combined with a renegotiation option. If the number
of transactions exceeds a certain limit, prices have to be renegotiated again. Due to economies of scale, the service provider
should be able to reduce unit costs when volumes increase. Then, the outsourcer expects a decrease of prices. Bank 2 and
Bank 3 did not implement a price cap. Therefore, their pricing scheme is inflexible. If volumes increase and their vendors
realize further economies of scale, neither Bank 2 nor Bank 3 can expect to realize additional cost savings. Thus, price caps
combined with a renegotiation option are a further tool to ensure the achievement of cost savings.
Table 4 sums up our results and highlights the importance of ‘complementary’ clauses to reduce outsourcing risks from the
outsourcer’s perspective.
Risk Factor Event 'Complementary' Contract
Clauses
Result
(for the Outsourcer)
Moral Hazard,
Process Specificity
Service Debasement SLAs with Penalty-Reward-
System
Reduced Payment to the Service
Provider
Moral Hazard, Service Debasement Liability Financial Compensation for Loss
Uncertainty Volume Fluctuation Price Cap with Renegotiation
Option
Renegotiations Resulting in New
"Fair" Pricing Structure
Uncertainty Fixed Date for Benchmarking
(as contractually agreed upon)
Benchmarking with
Renegotiation Option
Renegotiations Resulting in New
"Fair" Pricing Structure
Uncertainty Fixed Date for Renegotiations
(as contractually agreed upon)
Renegotiation Clause within
SLA Framework
Renegotiations Resulting in an
Updated Definition and Pricing
of Respective Service
Table 4. Results Case Study Analysis
Answering our research questions, it can be established that the design of the contract influences the impact of risk factors on
the extent of undesirable outcomes (H1 and H2). ‘Complementary’ contract clauses need to be linked with each other to
effectively mitigate risk. The extent of negative consequences is heavily affected by the extent of undesirable outcomes, since
all of the potential outcomes lead to quantitative or qualitative losses (H3). Finally, the extent of negative consequences
negatively affects outsourcing success (H4). However, by synchronizing the objectives of the in- and outsourcer ex ante and
agreeing upon contract clauses which compensate for losses ex post, the  impact  of  risk  on  outsourcing  success  can  be
minimized.
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LIMITATIONS
Our research is limited in two ways. First, generalization is limited as results are based on case study research. Second, we
focus on the outsourcer’s perspective only. We suggest for further research to also analyze the service provider’s perspective.
Thereby causes and drivers of moral hazard could be identified in greater detail.
CONCLUSION
The importance of contracts within outsourcing relationships has been stressed by various researchers. However, they either
just ‘claim’ the importance of the contract in general or they discuss the significance of single contract clauses. Our research
analyzes the effect of risk on outsourcing success and how ‘complementary’ outsourcing clauses effectively tackle
outsourcing risks. We emphasize the importance of managing outsourcing risks. Our study provides insights into the question
of how the severity of risks influences outsourcing success. These findings set the basis for the development of a risk and a
contract management capability.
While this study contributes to research by (a) combining the risk perspective with contract design and (b) analyzing the
‘complementarity’ of contract clauses, it is also valuable for practitioners. Outsourcers benefit from our research by knowing
(under risk mitigation aspects) which clauses should especially be paid attention to when entering into contract negotiations.
Our analysis helps outsourcers to define a clear ‘going-in position’ and supports them in their evaluation of the importance of
different contract clauses and their design for risk mitigation purposes. Thereby, practitioners become more aware of ‘what’s
worth fighting for’ during contract negotiations when an effective risk management is desired.
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